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TORT LAW-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-SETTLEMENTS-CONTRIBUTION-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a manufacturer was
independently liable under products liability for the failure to
warn of a known defect in a component part. The court also held
that a settlement by one joint tort-feasor -reduced the verdict
amount only by the settling defendant's pro-rata share, and that
the non-settling joint tort-feasor owed its full pro-rata share to the
plaintiff.
Walton v Avco Corp., Pa ,610 A2d 454 (1992).
On September 1, 1978, Dennis Earl McCracken was piloting a
helicopter in North Carolina for the purpose of ferrying a passen-
ger, Billy James Tincher.1 Tincher was an employee of the owner
of the aircraft, Phillips and Jordan Inc.2 The helicopter, manufac-
tured and sold by Hughes Helicopter Inc.,s had incorporated an
engine in production that was manufactured by the Avco Corp."
The engine seized during flight causing the helicopter to crash,
killing both McCracken and Tincher.5 Subsequent investigation re-
vealed that the malfunction was the result of the failure of an oil
pump in the engine manufactured by Avco.6 On July 30, 1976, thir-
teen months prior to the accident, Avco had become aware of de-
fects in it's oil pumps and issued a service instruction informing of
the condition and giving detailed instructions for it's correction."
Hughes received the service instruction but never forwarded it to
the helicopter owners or any authorized service centers.8
Suits were filed by the estates of the decedents against both
Avco and Summa." Both cases were consolidated for the purposes
1. Walton v Avco Corp., Pa ,610 A2d 454 (1992).
2. Walton, 610 A2d at 456.





8. Id at 457. The service instruction listed the next overhaul of the helicopter as the
time for correction of the engine defect. The helicopter was overhauled on September 14,
1977, thirteen and a half months after issuance of the service instruction, however due to
Hughes' failure to advise of the procedure the correction was never performed. Id.
9. Id at 456. Avco filed answers containing cross-claims against Hughes for contribu-
tion and or indemnity should an award be made in favor of the plaintiffs. Id.
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Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:643
of discovery and trial.10 Both Plaintiffs negotiated a settlement
with Avco of their respective claims, $922,355.00 for the Walton
claim, and $1,000,000.00 for the Tincher claim."1 The releases
made by Avco to the plaintiffs provided that the verdict be re-
duced by the greater of either the amount of consideration paid for
the release or for Avco's pro-rata share of liability as well as specif-
ically retaining Avco's right to seek indemnity and/or contribution
from Hughes. 2 Ultimately the cases were submitted to a jury
which found both Avco and Hughes strictly liable and made
awards to the plaintiffs for considerably less than the settlement
amounts." The jury found the engine produced by Avco to be de-
fective in design and that this defect was a substantial factor in
causing the fatal accident.1 ' The jury also found that Hughes' fail-
ure to inform the purchasers of the helicopter or the service cen-
ters of the defect was an independent design defect and a substan-
tial factor in causing the accident.15  Avco was awarded
contribution against Hughes for the amount Avco paid in excess of
their pro-rata share of the judgement.16 The superior court af-
firmed the award of contribution, but remanded for a determina-
tion of the amount owed to be made on a comparative fault basis.1 7
10. Id.
11. Id at 457. Avco amended it's answers to plead the releases. Id.
12. Id at 463. The release agreement provided:
It is further understood and agreed and it is the express intent of the parties to this
agreement that this release shall not in any way affect the rights of Avco . . . to
pursue claims of contribution and/or indemnity arising out of the same accident
against Summa corporation and/or Executive Helicopters, Inc.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED, however, that if it should be de-
termined that any person, firm or corporation not being released by the terms of this
release is jointly or severally liable to the claimants with any party herein released, in
tort or otherwise, the claim against and damages recoverable from such other person,
firm or corporation shall be reduced by the greater of the amounts determined as
follows
a. The amount of consideration paid for this release; or
b. The amount determined by the sum of the pro-rata share of legal responsibility or
legal liability for which the parties herein released are found to be liable as a conse-
quence of the aforesaid accident of September 1, 1978.
Id.
13. Id at 457. The cases were decided under products liability theory. The Waltons
were awarded $891,203.00, and the Tinchers $415,902.00. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Avco's request for pre-judgement interest and delay damages on the amount
of contribution awarded against Hughes was denied. The denial was affirmed by the supe-
rior court. Id.
17. Id. The trial court also found Hughes liable for delay damages to the Waltons
from the time of filing the complaint to the date of the settlement with Avco. The superior
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Hughes' claim for indemnification against Avco was denied due to
the finding that both the defendants were found to be indepen-
dently liable to the plaintiffs.' s
A number of complex and interrelated issues came before the
supreme court. First, whether Hughes, as a manufacturer of a
product, had an independent duty to warn of a defect of a compo-
nent part that was manufactured by another and of which Hughes
had notice of subsequent to the sale of the product. If Hughes was
found to have no independent duty, the court examined whether
Hughes was entitled to obtain indemnification from the component
part manufacturer. 19 Conversely, if such a duty was imposed on
Hughes, whether Avco as a result of their settling with the plain-
tiffs for an amount which exceeded the judgement, should have
been allowed contribution against Hughes, the non-settling joint
tort-feasor, or, should the plaintiffs be awarded Hughes' full pro-
rata share of liability of the judgement.2" Lastly, whether the allo-
cation of damages among joint tort-feasors who are strictly liable
under products liability should be determined on a comparative
fault basis.
21
In addressing the issue of Hughes's duty to warn and its subse-
quent liability, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 22 looked to sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (second) of Torts.23 Strict products
liability under section 402A developed to provide remedies for
those injured in situations where negligence was impossible to
prove due to the evolution of society and complex industrial tech-
niques. 24 The broad social policy the court found reflected in sec-
tion 402A is "when a product is released into the stream of com-
merce, it is the seller or manufacturer who is best able to shoulder
the costs and to administer to the risks involved. ' 25 Section 402A
court remanded this award as well for a determination of amount to be made on a compara-
tive fault basis. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id at 458.
21. Id.
22. Nix, C.J., writing for the majority was joined by Larsen, J., Flaherty, J., McDer-
mott, J., and Cappy, J.. Papadakos, J., filed a concurring opinion. Zappala, J., filed a concur-
ring and dissenting opinion.
23. Id. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was adopted as the law in
Pennsylvania in Webb v Zern, 422 Pa 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966). Id.
24. Id citing Azzarello v Black Brothers Inc., 480 Pa 547, 391 A2d 1020 (1978).
25. Id. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads:
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
1993 645
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requires only that a plaintiff prove that a product was sold in a
defective condition 26 and that this defect was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries.2 7 The court stated that Pennsylvania has
long held that the defective condition of a product includes the
lack of sufficient warnings or instructions for a products safe use.2"
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
26. The pertinent language of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides:
g. Defective Condition. The rule stated in this section applies only where the product
is, at the time it leaves the sellers hands, in a condition not contemplated by the
average consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.
i. Unreasonably Dangerous. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comments g & i (1965).
Pennsylvania has followed the Restatement standard for determining what constitutes a
defective product as well as judicially creating their own test for defective condition. Under
this standard a defect is found if "the product left the supplier's control lacking any element
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it un-
safe for its intended use." Azzarello, 391 A2d at 1027.
27. Walton 610 A2d at 458 citing Berkebile v Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa 83,
337 A2d 893 (1975).
28. Walton 610 A2d at 458. Comment h of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
h. A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and
consumption . . . Where, however [the manufacturer or seller] has reason to antici-
pate that danger may result from a particular use . . . he may be required to give
adequate warning of the danger (see comment j), and a product sold without such
warning is in a defective condition.
j. Directions or Warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container,
as to its use. . .and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if fol-
lowed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comments h & j (1965).
The court in its majority opinion in Berkebile wrote, " A defective condition is not limited
to defects in design or manufacture. The seller must provide with the product every element
necessary to make it safe for use. One such element may be warnings and/or instructions
concerning use of the product. A seller must give such warnings and instructions as are
required to inform the user or consumer of the possible risks and inherent limitations of his
product.. . . If the product is defective absent such warnings, and the defect is a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury, the seller is strictly liable without proof of negligence."
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The court applied the language of Section 400 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts29 which states "one who puts out as his own
product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same
liability as, though he were its manufacturer." 30 This imposition of
liability, the court stated, applied to manufacturers or sellers that
are assemblers of component parts. 1 The court found that Hughes
had incorporated a defective part within its helicopter and that
Hughes had undisputed knowledge of the defect.32 Having been in-
formed of the defect the court found that Hughes' duty to warn
was not extinguished merely because Avco had built the defective
component part in the engine.3 Hughes was required to make rea-
sonable attempts to warn the user or consumer directly of the po-
tentially dangerous defect.3 4 The court looked to the specific pecu-
liarity of the industry and the ease in which Hughes could have
informed purchasers as another factor in imposing liability. Thus,
the court found it entirely proper to find Hughes independently
liable by the imposition of strict liability for their failure to warn
of a known defect.36
Once the court established the independent liability of the man-
ufacturer for the failure to warn of a known defect in a component
part,3 7 disposing of the claim for indemnification against the com-
ponent part manufacturer logically followed." The court, following
its recent decision in Sirianni v Nugent Brothers Inc.," stated
Berkebile, 337 A2d at 902-03.
29. Section 400 was adopted as law in Pennsylvania in Forry v Gulf Oil Corp., 428
Pa 334, 237 A2d 593 (1968). Walton, 610 A2d at 459.
30. Walton, 610 A2d at 459 quoting section 400 Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965).
31. Walton, 610 A2d at 459.
32. Id. See note 8 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The superior court pointed out that helicopters as a product are unique in
that they are not of the type to be mass produced or mass marketed and thus to be lost in
the chain of commerce. It is not unusual for the seller or manufacturer to maintain close
contact with the purchasers or the service stations. Id.
36. Id at 460.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 509 Pa 564, 506 A2d 868 (1986). The case arose out of an accident in which Nu-
gent Bros., a demolition company, pursuant to a demolition contract entered into with the
city of Philadelphia, caused a brick wall to crash into the home of Mr. and Mrs. Sirianni,
killing Mrs. Sirianni and her unborn child. Sirianni, 506 A2d at 869. The Court held that
the city, who was found by the trial court to have been equally as negligent as the owner of
the demolished building was not entitled to indemnification from the owner of the building
for the payment of the judgment against the defendants. Id.
1993
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that the right to indemnity is only for one who has been found
liable merely by process of law against the party who rightfully
should bear the cost.40 The court refused to distinguish between
Hughes and Avco as primarily and secondarily liable for the pur-
pose of indemnification as per Builders Supply Co. v McCabe. 1
Rather, the court found the relationship between Hughes and Avco
to be concurrent primary liability, neither defendant's liability was
dependant or contingent upon the others, therefore the court held
that there was no right of indemnification between them.42
The court then determined to whom Hughes owed its share of
the damages. 43 The plaintiffs claimed that Hughes' full pro-rata
share of the award was owed to them, while Avco maintained that
by virtue of the release with the claimants and the Uniform Con-
40. Walton, 610 A2d at 460. The Walton court noted:
[U]nlike comparative negligence and contribution, the common law right of indem-
nity is not a fault sharing mechanism between one who was predominantly responsi-
ble for an accident and one whose negligence was relatively minor. Rather, it is a fault
sharing mechanism, operable only when a defendant who has been liable to a plaintiff
solely by operation of law, seeks to recover his loss from a defendant who was actually
responsible for the accident which occasioned the loss.
Id quoting Sirianni 506 A2d at 871.
41. Id citing Builders Supply Co. v McCabe, 366 Pa 322, 77 A2d 368 (1951). In
Builders the plaintiff brought an action for indemnity against the defendant arising out of
an automobile accident. Builders, 77 A2d at 368-70. The plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant, due to his negligent driving, caused the plaintiff's truck to swerve into the path of an
oncoming vehicle, resulting in an accident between the oncoming vehicle and the plaintiff's
truck. Id at 370. The defendant's automobile did not come into contact with either vehicle.
Id. The driver of the oncoming vehicle brought suit against the plaintiff for personal injuries
and property damage arising out of the accident. The jury awarded a verdict for three thou-
sand dollars. Id. The plaintiff paid the verdict and brought the present action. Id at 369.
The Court distinguished between primary and secondary liability, stating that this differ-
ence is in the character or kind of wrong which caused the injury and in the nature of the
legal obligation owed by each of the defendants toward the plaintiff, as opposed to the de-
gree of comparable negligence among the defendants. Id at 370. The Court offered numer-
ous examples of this distinction such as the relationship of employer and employee or that
of principal and agent. Id. An employer or principal is vicariously or secondarily liable for
the wrongs committed by his employee or agent, but the primary party that is liable is the
employee or agent that committed the tort. Id. The Court stated that:
the important point to be noted in all the cases is that secondary as distinguished
from primary liability rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive only . . . .In
the case of concurrent or joint tort-feasors, having no legal relation to one another,
each of them owing the same duty to the injured party, and involved in an accident in
which the injury occurs, there is a complete unanimity among the authorities every-
where that no right of indemnity exists on behalf of either against the other; in such a
case, there is only a common liability and not a primary and secondary one, even
though one may have been very much more negligent than the other.
Builders, 77 A2d at 371.
42. Walton, 610 A2d at 460.
43. Id.
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tribution Among Tort-Feasors Act (hereinafter UCATA),'4 4 they
were entitled to contribution against Hughes. 5 In following the
precedent of its recently decided opinion of Charles v Giant Ea-
gle,46 where a similar issue was decided, the court concluded the
holding of Charles, that a non-settling tort-feasor is liable to the
plaintiff for his full proportionate share of the damage award, re-
gardless of the amount paid by the settling defendant, was control-
ling in the present case.48 The importance of enforcing the Giant
Eagle policy which would encourage settlements was stressed.49
The opinion went on to state that crucial to the issue of the right
to contribution under the UCATA was the requirement that the
settling defendant extinguish the liability of the non settling joint
tort-feasor.50 Examining the release, the court opined that the re-
lease entered into by Avco was not made with the intent of releas-
ing or extinguishing Hughes from liability as well.5 1 In examining
Avco's decision to settle the court stated its belief that Avco, after
analyzing the possible risks and benefits, made a business decision
to settle to avoid litigation and could not now ask Hughes to reim-
burse them for what had been shown to have been bad judge-
ment.52 Thus, the court held that Giant Eagle precluded a recov-
ery of contribution by Avco against Hughes, and that the superior
court erred in affirming the trial court's award of contribution.5 3
The final issue addressed by the supreme court was the determi-
nation of the proper apportionment of damages among the joint
tort-feasors. The court rejected the superior court's determination
that liability should be determined on a comparative fault basis.
54
The court found it improper in a case of strict liability, where
neither defendant was found liable under the theory of negligence,
44. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 8321 (Purdon 1976).
45. Walton, 610 A2d at 460.
46. 513 Pa 474, 522 A2d 1 (1987). See note 101 and accompanying text.
47. Walton 610 A2d at 460.
48. Id at 461. See also Charles, 522 A2d at 3.
49. Id. The Court held "settlements are encouraged because they result in early re-
ceipt of funds by the plaintiffs and reduced volume of litigation." Id. See also Charles, 522
A2d at 1.
50. Id. The UCATA provides in section 8324 (c): "Effect of settlement.- A joint
tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover
contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose liability to the injured person is not extin-
guished by the settlement." 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 8324-8326 (Purdon 1982).
51. Walton, 610 A2d at 461.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id at 462.
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and both were found to be equally at fault, to introduce compara-
tive causation concepts for apportionment of damages. 55 In re-
jecting the superior court's view, the court expressed its belief that
it would be impossible to determine that one of the defendants was
more liable than the other.
Justice Zappala concurred as to the holding that Hughes was in-
dependently liable for its failure to warn of a known defect in its
product, and that concepts of comparative fault should not be used
in apportioning damages among strictly liable joint tort-feasors.57
Justice Zappala dissented from the majority's holding that Avco
has no right of contribution against Hughes. The dissent looked
to the specific terms of the release entered into between the plain-
tiff and Avco, and based on this language, distinguished Walton
from the Charles decision upon which the majority relied.59 The
specific terms of the release expressly retained the settling tort-
feasors right to contribution. The dissent stated that the opinion
of the superior court was more in keeping with the principles cre-
ated in Charles, and would do more in furthering the policy of pro-
moting settlements." Justice Zappala pointed to the contradiction
between the majority's statement that "the responsibility of the
settling tort-feasor should be finally resolved by the terms of the
settlement",62 and the majority's disregard of the terms of the
Avco settlement in Walton."8 Further, Justice Zappala stated that
under the majority's holding, the contractual agreement between
the plaintiffs and the settling tort-feasor would be discarded, and
that a right to contribution would never be upheld in a case involv-
ing a settlement by one joint tort-feasor. 4 He questioned the ma-
jority's willingness to decide cases based on a desire to further one
policy, yet in doing so ignoring an equally important policy of en-
55. Id. The supreme court has continued to refuse to incorporate concepts of negli-
gence into areas of strict liability. Id. See Azzarello v Black Brothers Company Inc., 480 Pa
547, 391 A2d 1020 (1978).
56. Walton, 610 A2d at 462. The court found both defendants equally liable stating
"Had the engine not had a defect, no crash would have resulted. Had Hughes put its knowl-
edge into action, the defect would have been cured and the accident prevented." Id.
57. Id at 463 (Zappala dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. See note 12 for the text of the release.
61. Id at 464. See note 116 and accompanying text.
62. Id citing Charles, 522 A2d at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id at 465.
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forcing contractual obligations. 5
The concept of multiple defendants is well rooted in the com-
mon law. In Borough of Carlisle v Brisbane6 the principle was ex-
pressed that where one suffers an injury through the concurrent
negligence of two or more persons, they are jointly liable for the
injuries, and an action may be held against them either jointly or
severally.6 7 Once a judgement was obtained against joint tort-
feasors, the law allowed for the plaintiff to proceed against either
party for the payment of the entire judgement.6 8 The courts have
long held, however, that a plaintiff may have only one satisfaction
of his claim."s Any payment of the judgement by one defendant
acted as a satisfaction of the entire judgement, thus releasing all
other wrongdoers and precluding the plaintiff from seeking pay.-
ment from the other defendants.70
The effect that a pre-judgement settlement by one joint tort-fea-
sor had on the plaintiff's ability to seek satisfaction of the judge-
ment was expressed in Thompson v Fox.7 1 The court found that a
release of one joint tort-feasor either by payment of a judgement,
or by consideration paid for a release of the tort-feasor, acted as a
satisfaction of the claim and thus released all other defendants lia-
ble for the same injury. 72 The court stated that this rule held true
even if unintended or if the release expressly stated that the other
65. Id.
66. 113 Pa 554, 6 A 372 (1886). Carlisle arose out of an accident when a horse and
sleigh in which the plaintiff was riding overturned due to the street being in a state of
disrepair and the alleged negligence of the driver. Carlisle, 6 A at 372. The plaintiff sus-
tained injuries and brought suit against the city of Carlisle and the driver of the sleigh. Id.
67. Id at 373.
68. Seither v Philadelphia Traction Co., 125 Pa 397, 17 A 338 (1889). In Seither the
plaintiff was injured in a collision between two street cars. Seither, 17 A at 338. He executed
a release with the carrying car company in which he agreed to prosecute the claim against
the other car company and to reimburse the settling tort-feasor should he recover. Id. The
court held this agreement and release to be a bar to the subsequent action against the non-
settling joint tort-feasor even though the non settling tort-feasor may be liable for the in-
jury. Id at 339.
69. Id at 338 citing Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns 290.
70. Id. The court stated; "This agreement and release was a bar to recovery in this
action. The plaintiff received one satisfaction; he was not entitled to a second." Id.
71. 326 Pa 209, 192 A 107 (1937). In Thompson the plaintiff was injured when struck
by an automobile. Thompson, 192 A at 108. The plaintiff was then taken to the private
hospital of the defendant wherein he was treated for his injuries. Id. Plaintiff brought an
action in negligence against the driver of the automobile for his injuries.Id. The claim was
settled with the driver by a written instrument that released the driver from all claims and
demands arising out of the accident.Id. The plaintiff then proceeded in bringing an action
for his injuries against the physician alleging negligence in his treatment. Id.
72. Id at 109.
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tort-feasors should not be released. 3
It was deeply rooted in the law that there existed no right of
contribution among joint tort-feasors.7 4 In North Pennsylvania R.
Co. v Mahoney7 5 the court did not allow a tort-feasor, who was
forced to discharge the common liability of the other joint tort-
feasors by paying the full amount of the damage award to the in-
jured party, to seek contribution from his fellow wrongdoers. 76 Two
primary reasons were advanced in support of this rule. First, was
the lack of ability to apportion damages among defendants by
comparative causation. 7 Second, was the court's reluctance to al-
low wrongdoers redress for their acts from other wrongdoers.
The rule of law that disallowed contribution among joint tort-
feasors was primarily confined to cases where the defendant, who
had been forced to pay the damages, knew or was presumed to
have known that the act in which he participated in and was found
liable for was unlawful.7 The concept of contribution, however,
was applied broadly as in Goldman v Mitchell-Fletcher7e to cases
involving other forms of liability. The court in Goldman allowed
for contribution between defendants found liable under the theory
of negligence.8 0 The court stated that a person would not be de-
73. Id. The court reasoned that "the principle which underlies this rule is that the
injured person is given a legal remedy only to obtain compensation for the damage done to
him, and when that compensation has been received from any of the wrongdoers, his right
to further remedy is at an end. . .[W]here both are liable for the same damage, no matter
upon what theory their respective liabilities are predicated, the rule applies." Id.
74. Merryweather v Nixan, 8 T R 186 (1799).
75. 57 Pa 187 (1868). In Mahoney the plaintiff, a child of four years, was injured
when struck by an oncoming train. Mahoney, 57 Pa at 187. At the time of the accident the
child was being carried across the railroad tracks directly ahead of the train by an adult in
an effort to avoid any harm. Id at 188. The adult dropped the plaintiff causing her to be
struck by the train. Both the railroad company and the adult were found to have been
negligent. Id. The plaintiff chose to bring an action against the railroad which subsequently
paid the entire verdict. Id.
76. Id at 190.
77. Railroad v Norton, 24 Pa 465 (1855). The Court stated "the law has no scales to
determine whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief."
Norton, 24 Pa at 469.
78. Boyer v Bolender, 129 Pa 324, 18 A 127 (1889). Several directors of an insurance
company had paid off a judgement recovered against them jointly for the fraudulent appro-
priation of funds from the company for their own use. Boyer, 18 A at 127. It was decided
that the paying tort-feasors could not enforce contribution from the other defendants be-
cause they had participated in and known of the fraud. Id.
79. 292 Pa 354, 141 A 231 (1928).
80. Goldman, 141 A at 231. In Goldman a street car passenger recovered a judgement
for personal injuries sustained in a collision between a street-car and a wagon. Contribution
between the street-car company and the owner of the wagon as joint tort-feasors was al-
lowed. Id at 234.
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prived of contribution from another who was also liable, when the
grounds of the liability was merely negligence of both in carrying
out a lawful act.81 The reasoning behind the right to contribution
as stated in Puller v Puller,82 was founded in the concept of equity.
Since equity was seen as equality the court allowed contribution on
equitable grounds, meaning that since all the defendants were re-
sponsible for the injury they should all share equally in the com-
mon burden of damages.83
The rules of contribution were codified and enacted as the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act ("UCATA") of July 19,
1951. 84 Since the UCATA allows for contribution among joint tort-
feasors,85 an injured party may settle with one or more of the tort-
81. Id at 235. The court opined that; "On principle I can see no reason why, when a
joint judgment debt has resulted from a joint wrong, each codebtor should not pay his share;
or why, if one be compelled by the creditor to pay the whole debt, the other should be
enabled to go free." Id at 233 citing Palmer v Wick and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co.,
1894 Appeal Cases 318, 322.
82. 380 Pa. 219, 110 A2d 175 (1955). The car in which Puller, his wife and daughter
were riding, collided with a locomotive of the East Broad Top Railroad and Coal Co. Puller,
110 A2d at 176. The Railroad joined Puller as an additional defendant citing his negligence
as a contributing cause. Id. The jury returned verdicts for the wife and daughter against
both the Railroad and Puller as joint tort-feasors. Id at 177. The Railroad paid the verdicts
in full and proceeded to seek contribution against Puller for half the amount. The court,
while denying recovery for other reasons, stated that contribution among joint tort-feasors is
allowable as a matter of equity. Id.
83. Id. The court held that "the theory is that as between two tort-feasors the contri-
bution is not a recovery for the tort, but the enforcement of an equitable duty to share
liability for the wrong done." Id at 177.
84. Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, Act of July 19, 1951, 1951 Pa
Laws 1130, codified at 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 8321 (Purdon 1976).
85. The UCATA as enacted in Pennsylvania reads in pertinent part:
Section 8324 Right of contribution
(a) General rule-The right of contribution exists among joint tort-feasors.
(b) Payment required-A joint tort-feasor is not entitled to a money judgement for
contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid
more than his pro rata share thereof.
(c) Effect of settlement-A joint tort-feasor who enters into settlement with the in-
jured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
Section 8325 Effect of judgement
The recovery of a judgement by the injured person against one tort feasor does not
discharge the other tort-feasor.
Section 8326 Effect of release as to other tort-feasors
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after
judgement, does not discharge the other tort-feasor unless the release so provides, but
reduces the claim against the other tort-feasor in the amount of the consideration
paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides
that the total claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 8324-8326 (Purdon 1982).
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feasors and still have recourse against the remaining tort-feasors
for the balance of any damages awarded and the settling tort-fea-
sor may seek contribution from the other defendants. Specifically
in Swartz v Sunderland86 the court, looking to the intent of the
UCATA, allowed contribution for one joint tort-feasor who had
settled with the plaintiff against the non settling defendant, in ab-
sence of a jury verdict.
87
The issue presented in Daugherty v Hershberger8 8 was one of
first impression for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Daugh-
erty the court was required to determine whether the amount of a
judgment against joint tort-feasors would be reduced by the
amount of consideration paid in a settlement with one tort-feasor
in excess of their percentage fault or was it to be reduced by the
settling defendant's pro rata share.8 ' The court interpreted the
language of the UCATA as "wholly unambiguous" 90 in opining
that it was clear that the amount of the judgment should be re-
duced by the amount of consideration paid for the release or the
defendants pro rata share, whichever is greater." Thus where a
plaintiff settled for more than his share of the damages, as deter-
mined by the jury, the settlement reduced the judgement dollar for
dollar. In reaching this conclusion the court reasoned that such an
86. 403 Pa 222, 169 A2d 289 (1961). The issue arose out of an automobile accident,
one defendant settled with the injured parties before the entry of the suit and gained a
release off all claims against both tort-feasors. Swartz, 169 A2d at 289. The settling tort-
feasor then sought contribution of one-half the amount paid in settlement. Id at 290.
87. Id at 291. "Nobody would deny that payment of an injured persons claim by one
of the tort-feasors, pursuant to a settlement instead of after judgement in a lawsuit, should
entitle the paying tort-feasor to recover contribution to his payment from other joint tort-
feasors." Id citing 9 U.L.A. 236.
88. 386 Pa 367, 126 A2d 730 (1956).
89. Daugherty, 126 A2d at 733. The action arose out of an automobile accident be-
tween Daugherty along with members of his family, and Hershberger and Mong. Id at 732.
Mong settled with the plaintiffs and had releases executed in his favor discharging him of
any and all liability and providing that any damages recovered against other tort-feasors
would be reduced by Mong's pro rata share, that being fifty percent. Id. Verdicts were re-
turned against both Mong and Hershberger for less than the-settled amounts. Id. Plaintiffs
maintained that the release with Mong stipulated for the verdicts to be reduced by his pro
rata share and that therefor they should receive one-half the verdict amount from the non-
settling tort-feasor, Hershberger. Id. Hershberger contended that his liability was reduced
by the amount of the consideration of the release of Mong's in excess of his pro rate share,
thus he is liable for less than his pro rate share. Id at 733.
90. Id at 733.
91. Id. "[If the proportion of reduction provided by the release is greater than the
amount of consideration paid for the release, such proportion of reduction prevails, but if,
on the other hand, the consideration paid for the release is greater than the proportion of
reduction provided by the release, than the amount of consideration paid for the release
prevails." Id.
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interpretation of the UCATA prevented the plaintiff from ob-
taining a double recovery for his injuries.9 2
In the companion case of Mong v Hershberger9s the superior
court allowed contribution against Hershberger for the amount
paid in the settlement that was greater than Mong's pro rata share
of the judgment. 4 The court, following equitable principles, opined
that it would be inequitable not to allow Mong contribution
against Hershberger merely because he overestimated the value of
the claims..5 In reaching this conclusion, attention was given to
section 8324(c) of the UCATA, 9' which provides that a settling
tort-feasor cannot seek contribution from a non-settling defendant
whose liability is not extinguished by the release. The court, inter-
preting this section, refused to believe that the legislature intended
to give such a strict definition the term "extinguished" so as to
require that the non-settling defendant's total pro-rata share be
paid by the settlement. Instead the court allowed for any partial
reduction of the non-settling tort-feasor's share by overpayment of
the settling defendant to extinguish the judgment by the amount
overpaid. 7
The Comparative Negligence Act of 197698 adopted a compara-
tive negligence system in Pennsylvania. This Act modified the law
as to joint tort-feasors and the apportionment of damages. Under
the Act the percentage of causal liability could be determined.
Charles v Giant Eagleee was the first case in which the court ex-
92. Id.
93. 200 Pa Super 68, 186 A2d 427 (1962). Mong brought an action in assumpsit
against Hershberger for contribution for the amount Mong paid above his proportionate
share. Mong, 186 A2d at 428.
94. Id at 429. The court, citing the equitable principles on which contribution rests,
stated "As it would be inequitable for a plaintiff to recover twice, it is just as inequitable
among joint tort-feasors to have one benefit at the expense of another." Id.
95. Id.
96. See note 85 for the language of the UCATA.
97. Mong, 186 A2d at 429.
98. The Comparative Negligence Act, Act of July 9, 1976, 1976 Pa Laws 855, codified
at 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7102, reads in pertinent part:
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution-Where recovery is allowed
against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion
of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his
causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the
allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from
recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share
may seek contribution.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982 & Supp 1992).
99. 513 Pa 474, 522 A2d 1 (1987).
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amined the effect of the Comparative Negligence Act 0' on settle-
ments, contribution, and the liability of non-settling joint tort-
feasors. In Charles, the supreme court interpreted the Compara-
tive Negligence Act as applied to the UCATA. The court ruled
that the judgement award should be reduced by the pro-rata share
of the settling defendant, regardless of the amount of consideration
paid for the release. The non-settling joint tort-feasor would thus
be liable to the plaintiff for his full pro-rata share.' The court
stressed that the result in Charles would work to encourage a pol-
icy of settlement of claims." 2 Also, the court rejected the appellee's
contention that the jury verdict more accurately measures the tort-
feasor's obligation than the amount agreed upon between the par-
ties in the settlement.0 3 The court stated that the result in
Charles was compatible with the Comparative Negligence Act and
the UCATA, and provided the parties to the release with an option
to decide the amount that the total verdict shall be reduced by the
settlement. 04
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions in Charles and
Walton were a sharp move away from the previous, well articu-
lated rules governing settlements and releases. The rules of law in
this area, as developed in Daugherty and its companion case of
100. 42 Pa Cons Stat'Ann § 7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp 1992).
101. Charles, 522 A2d at 2. Appellant George Charles ("Charles") filed an action
against appellee Giant Eagle Markets ("Giant Eagle") for damages resulting from injuries
sustained in a fall near the door of one of Giant Eagle's stores. Id. Giant Eagle joined Stan-
ley Magic Doors Inc., and Jed Door Inc., ("Stanley"), a single entity, as co-defendants. Id.
Prior to trial Charles executed a release to Giant Eagle for $22,500.00. Id. The jury returned
a verdict for Charles in the amount of $31,000.00. Id. The jury found Giant Eagle 60%
negligent and Stanley 40% negligent. Id. Thus, had Giant Eagle not settled with Charles,
their proportionate share of the verdict would have been $18,600.00, $3,900.00 less than the
consideration paid for the release. Stanley's proportionate share of the verdict was
$12,400.00. Id. Stanley paid Charles $8,500.00, maintaining that the verdict against it should
be reduced by the amount by which Giant Eagle's payment exceeded 60% of the verdict. Id.
Charles reserved his claim to the remainder of Stanley's share of the verdict, Stanley filed a
petition to have the judgment marked satisfied arguing that the verdict had been paid in
full. Id. The trial court granted the petition and the superior court affirmed.
102. Id at 3.
103. Id. The court held
[Alppellee's concern over a windfall to the plaintiff, if appellee were to be required to
pay its full pro-rata share, is far overshadowed by the injustices of the result they
now urge. In addition to the erosion such a policy would have upon a policy encourag-
ing settlements, it is also bottomed on a fundamentally wrong premise..There is no
basis for concluding that the jury verdict must serve as a cap on the total recovery
that a plaintiff may receive.
Id.
104. Id at 4. See note 120 and accompanying text for the release language.
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Mong, were completely disregarded by the court. In Charles, as
pointed out by Justice Zappala, the court had given a new inter-
pretation to the "wholly unambiguous"1 5  language of the
UCATA. 106 Justice Nix, writing for the majority in Charles, stated
that the result of the new interpretation was to promote a strong
policy toward the settlement of claims.10 7 Again in Walton the ma-
jority maintained the "importance of encouraging settlements and
• . . the necessity of respecting their finality . . . [were] the poli-
cies that fueled our decision in that case. 1 08 The court maintained
that the rule that a release of one joint tort-feasor acts to reduce
the verdict by that wrongdoer's pro-rata share, regardless of the
,amount of consideration paid, and that the non settling defendant
is liable only to the plaintiff for his full pro-rata share, is one that
will support the court's policy of encouraging settlement.0 9 The
statutory language of section 8326, however, provides that the
amount of payment in a settlement works to reduce the verdict
amount by the value of the consideration given for the release, or
by the settling defendants share, whichever is greater."10 The court
in Daugherty was clear in its opinion that this interpretation was
the proper legislative intent of the act."'
The court's current reliance on the Comparative Negligence Act
as modifying the UCATA to the extent that it now supports its
new interpretation is without basis in reason. In Charles, the court
stated that due to the Act, any settling defendant must have only
intended to settle for his pro-rata share."' However, the language
of the release in Walton implied that the parties had contemplated
that the settlement amount would be for more than the pro-rata
share of the settling defendant's liability. The release provided for
105. Daugherty 126 A2d at 733.
106. Charles, 522 A2d at 11 (Zappala dissenting). "By the stroke of its pen, the major-
ity today has not only rewritten the [UCATA] so as to render it meaningless and senseless,
it has obliterated the explicit legislative right of contribution which exists among joint tort-
feasors . .". Id.
107. Id at 2, "Settlement is a valuable tool in our arsenal of dispute resolution and it
should not be undermined."Id.
108. Walton, 610 A2d at 461.
109. Charles, 522 A2d at 3, the court states, "[Wihere a release has been executed, the
verdict is reduced only by the proportionate share of the settling tort-feasor. The actual
amount of the release, if it exceeds this sum, is of no consequence in the satisfaction of the
judgement of the remaining defendants." Id.
110. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 8326 (Purdon, 1982). For the actual text of the act see
note 85 and accompanying text.
111. Daugherty, 125 A2d at 733.
112. Charles, 522 A2d at 10 (Papadakos concurring).
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the reduction of the verdict by "the greater of" either the amount
of consideration paid for the release or, the settling tort-feasor's
pro-rata share of liability." " This clearly demonstrated that both
parties considered that the amount of consideration may be for a
dollar amount in excess of the settling defendant's proportional
share of liability as determined by the jury. Thus, the non-settling
joint tort-feasor's share of liability would be extinguished in the
amount of consideration paid for the release that was in excess of
the settling tort-feasor's proportionate share. In Walton, the
amount extinguished was the non-settling defendant's total share
due to the settlement amounts being greater than the entire jury
award. The only effect the Act has on proportioning fault is to per-
mit a determination of the percentage share of causal negligence,
not to render the UCATA meaningless. Fault was apportioned
among joint tort-feasors prior to the Comparative Negligence Act
on an equal or pro-rata bases without rendering the language of
the UCATA meaningless and the creation of proportional fault ap-
portionment should not do so now.
The new interpretation of the Act developed in Charles and ap-
plied to Walton, creates the policy that there can be no contribu-
tion against a non-settling joint tort-feasor. The court, in Walton,
stated that the right to seek contribution was determined by the
provision of the Act which requires the liability of the non settling
defendant to be extinguished first."' However, following the rea-
soning of the court's interpretation, a settlement will never act to
extinguish more than the settling tort-feasors pro-rata share. In
Walton the settlement amounts were for a sum greater than the
entire jury verdict. 15 This was irrelevant to the court and was not
seen to extinguish the common liability of the defendants pursuant
to section 8321.
The basis for this drastic change in the law was to alleviate an
overburdened judicial system and save resources by promoting a
policy of settlement of claims. However as the superior court has
stated, the rule created in Daugherty and abandoned in Charles
may do more to further this policy objective:
[Tihe plaintiff is encouraged to settle in view of the fact that he will recover
113. Walton, 610 A2d at 463 (Zappala concurring and dissenting). See note 12 and
accompanying text for the Walton release language.
114. Id at 461.
115. Id at 457. The Walton action was settled for $922,355 and the jury award was for




at least the amount of the jury verdict entered against the joint defendants
and perhaps a greater amount where the release consideration exceeds the
total jury verdict. The non-settling defendant, where the settling defendant
has preserved the right to seek contribution, has no incentive to allow the
case to go to trial in hopes of securing a windfall at the settling defendants
expense. The settling defendant, who protected his contribution rights, has
appropriately reached an agreement which is satisfactory to the plaintiff
and has at the same time protected his own interest in a fair and reasonable
manner."
The current interpretation by the court does not seem to be a rule
that will work to encourage the policy of settlements. Defendants
seeking to avoid the inconsistencies of trial are likely to be more
hesitant in offering to settle when confronted with the realization
that if the verdict proves them to be overly generous in their set-
tlement, they have no opportunity to seek contribution and be re-
imbursed for their overpayment.
Regardless of the effect of the new rule toward settlements and
releases, the court in an effort to encourage a policy should still be
restrained by statutory language. The court, in pursuing a policy
objective and reversing well established precedent, has acted legis-
latively to modify a statute that was clear in meaning and applica-
tion. In this manner the court has overreached its authority. The
language of the Act has not changed since first interpreted in
Daugherty, however the court's interpretation of this "wholly un-
ambiguous" language has. As Justice Zappala pointed out in
Charles the will of the legislature has been substituted for that of
the court.
117
The key distinction between Charles and Walton lies in the dif-
ference of the expressed language of their respective releases. The
most perplexing result of the court's application of Charles on the
Walton decision was the disregard for the contractual rights and
duties of parties to a release. The court expounded upon the im-
portance of the contractual terms of a release in Charles stating
that "the finality of the settlement agreement [the release] is cru-
cial" 8 and that "the responsibility of settling tort-feasors should
be finally resolved by the terms of the settlement."1" 9 The release
in Charles provided that the amount of the release would serve to
reduce the verdict only by the settling defendant's pro-rata
116. Id at 464, 465 (Zappala concurring and dissenting citing Walton v Avco, 383 Pa
Super 518, 542, 557 A2d 372, 385).
117. Charles, 522 A2d at 11 (Zappala dissenting).




share. 120 Thus the rule that a release acts to reduce the verdict by
the pro-rata share of the settling defendant regardless of the con-
sideration paid for the release, can be reconciled with the specific
terms of the Charles release.
The release in Walton however, specifically retained Avco's right
of contribution, as well as providing for the reduction of the ver-
dict by the greater of either the amount of the consideration paid
or that defendant's pro-rata share. 121 When the holding of Charles
was applied to the specific terms of this release, the court aban-
doned their position of the finality of the settlement agreement in
determining the rights of the parties. In Charles, the court opined
that "this section [8326 UCATA] affords the parties to the release
an option to determine the amount or proportion by which the to-
tal claim shall be reduced provided that the total claim is greater
than the consideration paid. 1 22 The court failed to follow that in-
terpretation and rendered meaningless the contractual agreement
when confronted with the express terms of the Walton release by
not allowing the party's agreement to control. The court in Charles
quoted Justice Musmanno's dissent in Daugherty stating: "The
[Giant Eagle] settlement was a purely voluntary compact between
two parties and we have no right to step in between them except to
see that [Stanley] is not called upon to pay more than [40%] of the
verdict. To go further is to intermeddle with the rights of people to
settle their own affairs. 1 23 The ruling in Walton is a sharp detour
from this rule and has shown the court's willingness to intermeddle
and then disregard the expressed contractual rights and duties of
parties to a settlement agreement.
Stephen J. Del Sole
120. Id at 5. The release specifically provided, "I further agree that any recovery that I
may obtain against any . . . corporation other than Giant Eagle Markets, Inc. .... shall be
reduced to the extent of the pro-rata share of. . . Giant Eagle." Id.
121. Walton, 610 A2d at 463 (Zappalla concurring and dissenting). See note 12 and
accompanying text for the Walton release language.
122. Charles, 522 A2d at 4.
123. Id at 10 quoting Daugherty, 126 A2d at 737 (Justice Musmanno dissenting).
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